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TAKING CERTIFICATION SERIOUSLY –  
WHY THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS AN ADEQUATE REPRESENTATIVE 
IN A SECURITIES FRAUD CLASS ACTION 
 
By Richard A. Booth 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Securities fraud class actions (SFCAs) arising under Rule 10b-5 are well established as a feature 
of the legal landscape, but they are a vestige of a largely outdated view of investor behavior and 
preferences. In the 1960s, most investors were undiversified stock pickers. Today, most investors 
hold stock through well diversified institutions. As a result, most investors are net losers from 
SFCAs. Moreover, it is arguable that it is irrational for most investors not to be diversified. A 
passive investor who fails to diversify assumes unnecessary risk for the same expected return that 
diversified investors enjoy. Given that federal securities law is intended to protect reasonable 
investors, it follows that it should be interpreted and applied consistent with the interests of 
diversified investors where the interests of diversified and undiversified investors diverge. For a 
diversified investor, gains and losses from securities fraud net out over time. But they lose to the 
extent of attorney fees and they lose when they are holders (which is most of the time) to the 
extent that defendant companies must compensate purchasers. In short, diversified investors 
would prefer that SFCAs be abolished. The one exception arises when insiders gain from the fraud 
such as by selling their shares before the release of bad news. But the appropriate remedy in such 
a case is a derivative action by which the company recovers from the wrongdoers. 
 
The thesis here is that the courts should decline to certify securities fraud actions as class actions 
under FRCP 23 because of the conflicting interests of class members. Undiversified stock pickers 
– usually a minority of the plaintiff class – may favor SFCAs. But many diversified investors – 
particularly those who follow a portfolio balancing strategy – would prefer that the courts refuse to 
certify such actions as class actions because such investors usually lose more on stock they hold 
than they gain on stock they bought during the class period. To be sure, many diversified investors 
(including institutional investors) engage in some stock picking (although some such as index funds 
eschew it altogether). Such an investor might favor certification of actions in which he has bought a 
large amount of the subject stock during the class period relative to preexisting holdings even 
though the same investor would favor the abolition of SFCAs generally. Moreover, not even a strict 
portfolio balancing investor who would oppose certification because she loses more on stock she 
holds than she gains on stock she bought would dare to opt out of the SFCA if it is certified. Thus, 
it does no good for the courts to rely on investors to vote with their feet. Investors who opt out of 
the action effectively pay those who stay in by forgoing compensation for their losses. The bottom 
line is that the courts should refuse to certify securities fraud actions as class actions unless it is 
shown that the plaintiff class is composed wholly of undiversified investors. If the action involves 
allegations that insiders have somehow gained from the fraud or that the corporation itself has 
been damaged by the fraud, the action should proceed as a derivative action. And given that a 
derivative action is a form of class action, it is quite clear that the courts have the power under 
FRCP 23 (and FRCP 23.1) to recast any purported SFCA in such terms. 
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This is not to say that individual investors should not continue to have standing to sue under Rule 
10b-5. Indeed, an investor who seeks to gain control or influence over a target company is likely to 
be undiversified. If such an investor suffers a fraud in connection with his purchase of target stock, 
he has standing to sue the wrongdoers if he can make out a claim. Nor does the argument here 
imply that there is a fundamental problem with remedies under the 1933 Act. In essence, the 1933 
Act provides for disgorgement by issuers in cases in which they have effectively misappropriated 
capital from the market by false pretenses. Similarly, in the context of an SFCA under Rule 10b-5 
in which insiders have gained from misappropriation (such as insider trading) during the fraud 
period or have visited loss on the issuer by damage to reputation or otherwise, the appropriate 
remedy if for the issuer to seek compensation. In other words, the approach advocated here is 
wholly consistent with the general scheme of federal securities law.   
 
Keywords: securities fraud, class action, certification, adequate representative, diversified 
investor, undiversified investor, stock picking, portfolio balancing, insider trading, misappropriation, 
derivative action, buyer-holder, opt-out, subclass, conflicting interests 
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TAKING CERTIFICATION SERIOUSLY -- 
WHY THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS AN ADEQUATE REPRESENTATIVE  
IN A SECURITIES FRAUD CLASS ACTION 
 
By Richard A. Booth* 
 
Introduction 
 
Over the last ten years, nearly 2400 securities fraud class actions (SFCAs) have been filed against 
publicly traded companies in the United States.1 These actions have resulted in settlements of 
about $27 billion and attorney fees of about $7 billion.2 More than one in fifty companies is the 
target of such an action each year.3 But for diversified investors – the great majority of investors – 
SFCAs confer no net benefit. Indeed, for diversified investors SFCAs reduce investment returns. At 
best, recovery is an expensive rearrangement of wealth from one pocket to another – minus a cut 
for the lawyers. Accordingly, and as I have argued elsewhere, SFCAs should be dismissed for 
failure to state a claim for compensable damages – and a fortiori for lack of loss causation – except 
in cases in which insiders have misappropriated stockholder wealth through insider trading or 
otherwise. Moreover, in such cases, diversified investors would prefer that the action be 
prosecuted in the name of the corporation seeking recovery by the corporation (whether by the 
corporation itself or derivatively).  
 
The thesis here is that the courts should decline to certify SFCAs as class actions because the 
conflicting interests of diversified investors and undiversified investors cannot be reconciled. The 
usual solution – the formation of subclasses – cannot work because the interests of the subclasses 
are diametrically opposed. While undiversified investors want the action to proceed, diversified 
investors prefer dismissal except in cases that properly seek recovery by the corporation. If the 
SFCA proceeds, diversified investors lose. As a result, it is impossible for anyone to be an 
adequate class representative. Accordingly, SFCAs are inherently unmanageable.  
 
                                                 
* Martin G. McGuinn Professor of Business Law, Villanova University School of Law. 
 
1 See Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Case Filings, 2005: A Year in Review, at 1. 
 
2 See Laura E. Simmons & Ellen M. Ryan, Cornerstone Research, Post Reform-Act Securities Settlements, 2005 
Review and Analysis, at 1; Anjan V. Thakor, The Economic Reality of Securities Class Action Litigation (Navigant 
Consulting, October 26, 2005), Exhibit A (finding plaintiff attorney fees of $1.7 billion in connection with settlements 
totaling $11.9 billion in a sample of 482 class actions). Assuming that this sample is representative of the percentage of 
settlement awarded as plaintiff attorney fees (approximately 14 percent in the sample), a good estimate of the total 
plaintiff attorney fees awarded in SFCAs since 1995 is $3.6 billion (14 percent of $26 billion). Assuming that defendant 
firms have been paid roughly the same amount, it seems a fair estimate that SFCAs have generated about $7 billion in 
attorney fees over the last ten years. To be sure, defendant firms are paid in all cases, whether or not the plaintiff 
prevails, but presumably defendant firm fees are a good deal less than plaintiff firm fees in cases in which plaintiffs 
prevail. Note that plaintiff attorney fees are paid out of the settlement and that accordingly the estimated amount 
available for investors was $26 billion less $3.6 billion or about $22.4 billion. See Thomas Baker & Sean Griffith, 
Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence from the Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurance Market (2006), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=909346.  
 
3 See Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Case Filings, 2005: A Year in Review, at 4. 
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The focus here is on SFCAs arising under the 1934 Act (Rule 10b-5) and relating to trading in 
outstanding shares. The argument does not apply in connection with actions arising under the 
1933 Act and relating to the public offer of shares. SFCAs under Rule 10b-5 usually arise from the 
failure of a publicly traded company to disclose material information in a timely fashion. The 
information itself may be either good news or bad news. In other words, an action may be triggered 
by news that causes the price of a stock to rise (in which case those who sold during the fraud 
period suffer harm) or by news that causes the price of a stock to fall (in which case those who 
bought during the fraud period suffer harm). There are notable examples of both types of fraud.4 
But actions based on bad news are far more common.5 Thus, the discussion here is based on the 
premise that securities fraud involves the failure to disclose bad news in a timely way. 
 
In a bad news case, the plaintiff class consists of all who purchased the stock in question during 
the fraud period and continue to hold it until corrective disclosure.6 The standard approach to 
damages in a bad news case is to award the difference between the price paid by the buyer and 
the market price after corrective disclosure.7 And it is the company (or its insurance company) that 
pays the award. 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (good news); Time Warner Securities Litigation, 9 F.3d 259 
(2d Cir. 1993) (bad news). There are, of course, many other forms of securities fraud, ranging from those arising in 
face-to-face dealings to those arising in connection with corporate level mismanagement, but these other actions are 
seldom amenable to pursuit as class actions. In other words, SFCAs invariably arise as a result of an issuer's failure to 
disclose material information to the market in a timely fashion. 
 
5 Actions based on bad news are more common because of the way damages are awarded in securities fraud class 
actions. Because the company pays, the stock price falls further thus enhancing damages through positive feedback 
and making the SFCA that much more lucrative for the plaintiff lawyers. In a good news case, the SFCA has the effect 
of muting the price increase through negative feedback and reducing the potential award. Data indicate that of the104 
SFCAs filed in 2006, only two involved good news. See Appendices. 
 
6 The fraud period is the period between an actionable misrepresentation or omission and corrective disclosure. Some 
may quibble with this characterization in that it can be unclear exactly when the truth comes out. See Broudo v. Dura 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 339 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 3478 (holding that loss causation may be 
proved by evidence that a stock was overpriced as a result of false statements or omissions at the time of purchase 
even though the price did not fall with corrective disclosure). See generally Jay W. Eisenhofer, Geoffrey C. Jarvis & 
James R. Banko, Securities Fraud, Stock Price Valuation, and Loss Causation: Toward a Corporate Finance-Based 
Theory of Loss Causation, 59 Bus. Law. 1419 (2004). Nevertheless, no one seems to deny that the price of the stock 
must decline for some reason after the plaintiff purchases, and most would likely agree that the decline must somehow 
be tied to the original failure of disclosure. Thus, for convenience, I will assume here that a prototypical SFCA involves 
a prolonged failure of disclosure followed by a corrective disclosure by which the whole truth comes out all at once and 
with no interim leakage. I should note that I do not distinguish here between misrepresentations and omissions. Both 
are generally actionable, although there are subtle differences in the relevant law. Compare Affiliated Ute Citizens of 
Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), with Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). In practice, most 
securities fraud class actions arise from some combination of the two. For example, a company might issue a press 
release or periodic report that is correct at the time of release. The press release then becomes false or misleading as 
a result of intervening events, but the company then fails to issue another release to correct the lingering false 
impression. See In Re Time Warner Securities Litigation, 9 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 
7 This description of how damages are calculated is a bit oversimplified, but it is good enough for present purposes. 
Although there has been no case in which a jury has actually done so, the courts have generally agreed that the jury 
should determine the correct market price of the subject stock on each day during the fraud period in effect creating a 
price line that would be compared to the market price day by day to determine the damages for investors who bought 
on any given day. This approach to calculating damages can be traced back to Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 
541 F.2d 1335 (9th Cir. 1976), and it is the formulation upon which Congress relied in connection with the Private 
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Although some investors may recover substantial sums in a class action, most investors lose from 
such actions. A diversified investor is equally likely to sell an overpriced stock as to buy one. For 
such investors, gains and losses wash out over time. In other words, a diversified investor is likely 
to gain from the timely sale of an overpriced stock about as often as she loses from the untimely 
purchase of an overpriced stock. But the investor who innocently sells an overpriced stock need 
not disgorge her (effective) gain. And over time such gains make up for losses. Thus, a diversified 
investor is effectively insured against securities fraud by virtue of being diversified. For a diversified 
investor, the cost of SFCAs – in attorney fees and other expenses – constitutes a deadweight loss.  
 
Diversified investors should be opposed to SFCAs for this reason alone. But diversified investors 
lose even more from SFCAs in cases in which they neither buy nor sell the subject stock – in cases 
in which they are mere holders of the subject stock. To be specific, the prospect of payout by the 
defendant company causes its stock price to fall more than it otherwise would even in a perfectly 
efficient market. It triggers a positive feedback mechanism that has the effect of magnifying the 
potential payout, sometimes with devastating effects. Indeed, about 30 percent of target companies 
end up bankrupt. 8 In other words, the prospect of payout to the plaintiff class causes the price of 
the subject stock to fall by an amount in addition to the decrease attributable to the disclosure of 
new negative information. That in turn increases the potential damages payable by the subject 
company causing a further decrease in price. And so on. The extent of feedback ultimately 
depends on the number of shares represented by the plaintiff class. For example, if the holdings of 
the plaintiff class are equal to 50 percent of the outstanding shares, the decrease in the price of the 
subject stock will be twice what it would have been in the absence of a class action.9 
 
For the foregoing reasons, diversified investors should be positively opposed to SFCAs except in 
cases in which insiders have taken advantage of the situation to misappropriate stockholder wealth 
                                                                                                                                                 
Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369 at 42. Although this is a common 
description of the measure of damages, and may well be applied in some cases, it is a gross oversimplification. For 
example, factors other than fraud may have affected market price before corrective disclosure, or the truth may dribble 
out. See Richard A. Booth, Windfall Awards Under PSLRA, 59 Bus. Law. 1043 (2004); Janet Cooper Alexander, 
Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1487, 1490-92 (1996); Michael Y. Scudder, The 
Implications of Market-Based Damages Caps in Securities Class Actions, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 435 (1997). Of course, 
most SFCAs are settled if they are not dismissed. Thus, it is unusual for damages ever to be awarded by a court. 
Nevertheless, the putative measure of damages will affect settlement negotiations. Moreover, given that the settlement 
of a class action must be approved by the court, the court itself may well consider the parties’ assumptions and 
estimates as to damages. Accordingly, I use the more neutral word award to refer herein to both damages and 
settlements. 
 
8 See Laura E. Simmons & Ellen M. Ryan, Cornerstone Research, Post Reform-Act Securities Settlements, 2005 
Review and Analysis, at 14  
 
9 The appendix sets forth the formula for calculating the feedback effect in both bad news and good news cases 
together with charts showing the results for various class sizes. See Richard A. Booth, The End of the Securities Fraud 
Class Action as We Know It, 4 Berkeley Bus. L. J. 1 (2007). http://ssrn.com/abstract=683197 One of the many 
problems associated with SFCAs is that there is no reliable way to determine the number of different shares traded 
during the fraud period, because there is no doubt that some shares are bought and sold during the fraud period.  See 
Robert A. Alessi, The Emerging Judicial Hostility to the Typical Damages Model Employed by Plaintiffs in Securities 
Class Action Lawsuits, 56 Bus. Law. 483 (2001). 
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through insider trading or other forms of misappropriation such as timing and backdating of options. 
In the absence of insider misappropriation, securities fraud is a zero sum game. Buyer losses are 
offset by seller gains. Investors in the aggregate – the market – neither gain nor lose. But if insiders 
use the opportunity to extract gains, investors suffer a genuine loss. In such cases, a diversified 
investor would prefer to have the issuer recover the ill-gotten gains by means of derivative action or 
direct action by the issuer. But there is no situation in which a diversified investor would favor a 
system of securities regulation that includes SFCAs as we know them.10 In contrast, an 
undiversified investor might favor a class action remedy. An undiversified investor may suffer real 
harm from securities fraud. An investor who forgoes the benefits of diversification and picks a 
single stock can lose her entire investment. For such an investor, the benefits of SFCAs may 
outweigh the costs.11 
 
In short, there is a fundamental conflict between the interests of diversified investors and the 
interests of undiversified investors.12 Diversified investors would oppose SFCAs while undiversified 
investors would favor such actions. Diversified investors would favor the prosecution of a derivative 
action in any case involving insider misappropriation. While undiversified investors would not object 
to a derivative action to recover for misappropriation, they would favor a class action over a 
derivative action if they had to choose between the two. To be sure, even a diversified investor 
might favor the prosecution of class actions in individual cases if other investors prosecute such 
actions. Indeed, a diversified investor really has no choice but to join in any class action that is filed 
for which he is eligible. If he fails to do so, the compensation that goes to other investors will 
reduce his returns without any offsetting gain from those cases in which he is eligible to join the 
plaintiff class. You gotta be in it to win it.  
 
As I have argued elsewhere, the courts could fix things by dismissing any SFCA in which there is 
no reason to believe that insiders have engaged in misappropriation on the theory that the class 
has suffered no compensable harm.13 As for those actions in which it appears that insiders have 
                                                 
10 It is ironic that the court (per Justice Ginsburg) begins its recent Tellabs opinion with the statement that it “has long 
recognized that meritorious private actions to enforce federal antifraud securities laws are an essential supplement to 
criminal prosecution and civil enforcement actions....” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 2007 US LEXIS 
8270. While the Court follows this statement with the qualification that it also recognizes that the system can be abused 
to impose unjustified costs on innocent companies and individuals, the tea leaves seem to indicate that the justices are 
not inclined to scrap the system. 
 
11 It is not completely clear that even an undiversified investor would favor the existing system if she understood that it 
causes stock price to fall more than it otherwise would. From an ex ante perspective such an investor is more likely to 
be a holder than to be a buyer and is thus more likely to lose as a result of feedback than to gain from being a member 
of the plaintiff class. 
 
12 See Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1487, 1506 (1996). 
 
13 This argument depends somewhat on the court looking at the class as a class broadly defined as all investors (or at 
least all buyers) and not as a cherry-picked collection of individuals who would prefer that the action proceed as a 
direct class action. In other words, the argument requires a court to focus on the net effect of the fraud. As a matter of 
settled law, a court cannot consider the interests of holders, but it can presumably consider the interests of buyer-
holders – those who owned some shares in the subject company before the fraud period and then bought additional 
shares during the fraud period – as explored in detail below. To some extent the courts do consider the net interests of 
the plaintiff class when (for example) they eliminate the claims of in-and-out traders in estimating damages. The 
tension between individual claims and net claims is also evident in the varying approaches to materiality. The Supreme 
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misappropriated stockholder wealth, the court should recharacterize the action as a derivative 
action.14  
 
The thesis here is somewhat different. It is that the courts should decline to certify a securities 
fraud action as a class action because the conflicting interests of diversified and undiversified 
investors make it impossible for a class action to be prosecuted consistent with the interests of 
both groups of investors. Specifically, FRCP 23(a) requires that the court determine that the 
representative plaintiff(s) will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. That is 
impossible where the interests of class members are diametrically opposed – where one group 
would favor prosecution of the action and one group would favor dismissal of the action. Thus, this 
is not a conflict that can be resolved by the formation of subclasses. Moreover, even if an adequate 
representative can be found, the requirements of FRCP 23(b)(3) relating to class actions for 
damages will be difficult (if not impossible) to satisfy. In a class action for damages, FRCP 23(b)(3) 
requires the court to consider: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the 
prosecution or defense of separate actions, (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning 
the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class, (C) the desirability or 
undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum, and (D) the 
difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action. All of these factors are 
problematic. Factor (A) is a problem because some members of the class would prefer that the 
action be dismissed. Factor (B) is a problem because a derivative action arguably provides 
complete relief without untoward side effects. Factor (C) is a problem because a derivative action is 
better handled in state court. And Factor (D) is a problem because (among other things) (1) it is 
difficult to draw the line between diversified and undiversified investors and (2) undiversified 
investors must presumably show reliance. 
 
This paper proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the relationship between diversification and the 
likely trading patterns of diversified investors and seeks to quantify the interests of various types of 
investors in connection with the prosecution of SFCAs. Part II discusses the application of FRCP 
23 in light of the likely interests of various investors and shows that few if any securities fraud 
actions that seek damages on behalf of individual investors should be certified as class actions. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Court has focused on an idealized reasonable investor in formulating the standard that a fact is material if a reasonable 
investor would consider it important in deciding how to act. But the court has emphasized that a fact need not be so 
important that it would change the investor’s decision. See TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976); 
Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). See also Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); Virginia 
Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083(1991). On the other hand, it is difficult to believe that a fact could be 
material if does not change the decision of any investor or if it does not have some effect on the market. See Dura 
Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005). Thus, some courts have ruled that for a fact to be material it must affect 
market price perceptibly. See Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 282 (3d Cir. 2000). But see No. 84 Employer-Teamster 
Joint Council Pension Trust Fund v. Am. W. Holding Corp., 320 F.3d 920, 934 (9th Cir. 2003).  
 
14 Whether an action is properly characterized as a direct action (a class action on behalf of individual investors) or a 
derivative action on behalf of the corporation (and ultimately for the benefit of the stockholders) is a question for the 
court. See Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R. Co., 417 U.S. 703 (1974); Tooley v. Donaldson, 
Lufkin, & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1033 (Del. 2004).  
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I. THE MATHEMATICS OF SECURITIES FRAUD CLASS ACTIONS 
 
In order to understand investor preferences in connection with the remedies provided by federal 
securities law, it is important to have some sense of the relative frequency with which an investor 
will be a buyer, a seller, or a holder. Thus, it is useful to consider the mix of situations that a 
diversified investor would likely encounter in the space of a year.  
 
Diversification and Trading 
 
There are about 10000 publicly traded companies listed on US stock exchanges. And there are 
about 200 SFCAs filed each year. Thus, about one in fifty companies will be the target of a class 
action in any given year. Consider an investor with a portfolio consisting of 500 stocks (equally 
weighted) and turnover of 40% per year.15 Assuming that the portfolio is worth $1,000,000, this 
hypothetical investor buys and sells $400,000 in stocks during the course of a year. The investor 
can expect that ten portfolio companies will be the target of a class action each year. Statistically, 
the investor will be a buyer in two cases, a seller in two cases, and a holder in six cases.16 From 
this analysis alone, the investor would likely see that SFCAs are wasteful. But we can be more 
specific. 
  
Assume that the investor holds $2000 worth of each of the 500 stocks. Assume further that each of 
the ten stocks affected by a class action would have fallen in price by 10% based solely on the 
disclosure of bad news (without any feedback effect). Assume yet further that the plaintiff class 
comprises 50% of the stockholders in each case.17  
In a world without SFCAs, the hypothetical investor would lose 10% of the value of each of eight 
stocks. He would avoid losses on the two stocks he sold.18 His total loss in connection with the ten 
stocks would thus be $1600. 
 
In a world with SFCAs, the investor would recover his losses on the two stocks that he bought (less 
fees and expenses). Assuming fees and expenses equal to 20 percent of recovery -- $80 for each 
                                                 
15 In 2006, the asset weighted turnover rate for stock mutual funds was 47% but two-thirds of all funds had turnover 
rates below 50%. Investment Company Institute, 2007 Investment Company Fact Book 23, 
http://www.ici.org/pdf/2007_factbook.pdf Thus, 40% seems like a fair estimate for the turnover rate one would expect 
for a conservative diversified investor who follows a buy and hold strategy and trades for portfolio balancing and tax 
planning. Marketwide, turnover averages just over 120% per year for US stocks. See NYSE Group Turnover 2007, 
available at:  http://www.nysedata.com/nysedata/asp/factbook/viewer_edition.asp?mode=table&key=2990&category=3  
 
16 This assumes that the average class period is one year. That is roughly correct. See Appendices. If the class period 
in the hypothetical were (say) two years, the investor could expect to be a buyer in four cases and a seller in four 
cases. For data on average class size, see Appendices. 
 
17 Note that this class size is consistent with the population of investors. If diversified investors constitute three-quarters 
of the investor population (as they do), half of the plaintiff class would be undiversified investors. This also assumes 
that undiversified investors hold a stock for about one year on average, while diversified investors hold a stock for 
about two years on average. 
 
18 It could be said that the investor actually enjoys a gain by selling the two overpriced stocks. But for present purposes 
of comparison it matters only that sales be treated consistently. For the sake of simplicity, these sales are treated as 
generating zero loss rather than a gain to the extent of overpricing. 
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stock – his net loss would be $160. He would avoid losses on the two stocks that he sold. But he 
would lose $400 on each of the six stocks that he held -- $200 from the fundamental decline in 
price and another $200 from the feedback effect that results from the payout to the plaintiff class.19 
The investor’s total loss would thus be $2560. If the investor opted out of the two class actions in 
which he was a member of the plaintiff class, he would lose $400 on each of those stocks, for a 
total loss of $3200.20 The following chart sets forth these results. 
 
 
 
 
 
WITH CLASS ACTION 
REMEDY / REMAIN IN 
 
WITH CLASS ACTION 
REMEDY / OPT OUT 
 
WITHOUT CLASS 
ACTION REMEDY 
 
BUY (2) 
 
 
(160) 
 
(800) 
 
(400) 
 
SELL (2) 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
HOLD (6) 
 
 
(2400) 
 
(2400) 
 
(1200) 
 
TOTAL (10) 
 
 
(2560) 
 
(3200) 
 
(1600) 
 
Clearly this hypothetical investor would be better off in a world without SFCAs. He would want lead 
plaintiffs in general to seek dismissal, but only if he could be assured that all lead plaintiffs would 
do so. In the absence of any such assurance, our investor would be compelled to remain in any 
class action for which he is eligible. In other words, if they could vote on the matter behind a 
Rawlsian veil of ignorance (not knowing whether they are buyers, sellers, or holders), diversified 
investors would vote against class certification. But once a diversified investor knows that she is a 
member of the plaintiff class, she will want the class action to proceed. What we have here is a 
collective action problem.21  
                                                 
19 Again, if the plaintiff class consists of 50% of the outstanding shares, the feedback effect in a bad news case will 
cause stock price to decline by exactly twice the amount that it would have declined in the absence of a class action. 
See appendix for formulas and calculations. 
 
20 If for some reason no class action was filed in those two cases, the investor would lose $200 in each of those two 
cases for a total loss of $2800. On the other hand, the market might assume that a class action would be filed (at least 
for some period of time following the bad news) thus enhancing the loss. Presumably the market would rebound 
promptly if the trial court declined to certify the class action.  
 
21 One might argue that if the award will be covered by insurance, diversified investors would generally favor class 
actions. But that will likely result in higher insurance rates for all companies in the future. And that means that a 
diversified investor will likely lose even more than he would have lost if the defendant company had paid. The bottom 
line is that diversified investors prefer to self insure against securities fraud. SFCAs are the equivalent of buying an 
extended warranty on a toaster. There may even be situations in which an undiversified investor would oppose a class 
action. If the plaintiff class is so large that success of the action threatens to bankrupt the defendant company and 
dirve the stock price to zero, the plaintiff class may be better off if the action is dismissed and the company survives. In 
other words, the value of stock in the surviving company may exceed the value of the potential recovery.  
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Portfolio Balancing and Trading 
 
The foregoing analysis is somewhat unrealistic. In the real world, a diversified investor often buys 
more of a stock that is already in her portfolio or sells some (but not all) of the shares of a stock in 
her portfolio simply for purposes of balancing the portfolio.22 For example, suppose that the 
investor finds that one of her 500 stocks -- Acme Fireworks is worth just $1500 while another -- 
Binford Tools – is worth $2500. She sells $500 worth of Binford and buys $500 worth of Acme to 
rebalance her portfolio. Shortly after these trades, Acme announces a restatement of earnings. 
Analysts revise their long-term projections for Acme downward by 10 percent. Ordinarily Acme 
should decrease in price by 10 percent (other things equal). But the stock settles at a price 20 
percent lower because of the feedback effect from an anticipated class action. A class action is 
filed on behalf of investors who bought Acme during the fraud period. On paper, the investor has 
lost $400 on her Acme investment. But she has standing to sue only with respect to the $500 
purchase and hence stands to recover at most $100 less $20 in fees and expenses or $80 net. So 
her loss on Acme stock will be $320 at the end of the day. In the absence of a class action, the 
decline would be 10 percent. And the investor would have a lost a total of $200 on her Acme 
investment.  
 
How would a diversified investor want the representative plaintiff to proceed in a world with class 
actions? In the previous example, where the diversified investor is assumed to trade all or nothing, 
he would (reluctantly) want the class representative to proceed with the class action. Not so for a 
portfolio-balancing investor. She would want the representative plaintiff to seek dismissal of the 
action or for the court to deny certification. As with the all-or-nothing trader, it would do no good for 
the portfolio-balancing investor to opt out of the class action. If the action proceeds, she must seek 
her share of the recovery.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
22 See Paul J. Lim, When It Comes to Rebalancing, a Little Means a Lot, New York Times, August 5, 2007, Business 
Section at 5; J. Alex Tarquinio, Oops, It May Be Time to Rebalance That Portfolio, New York Times, May 6, 2007, 
Business Section at 4:1; Mark Hulbert, If You Know Options, You're Likely to Know Stocks, New York Times, August 
13, 2006, Business Section at 7:1; PAUL J. LIM, Cash May Not Be King, but It's Wielding More Power, New York 
Times, July 9, 2006, Business Section at 5:1; Paul J. Lim, Hitting the Reset Button on Your 401(k), New York Times, 
January 8, 2006; Business Section at 5:1; Joseph Nocera, No, You Can't Invest Like Yale. Sorry!, New York Times, 
August 13, 2005, Business Section at 1:1; Carla Fried, 3 Men, 3 Strategies, But All Lead to Profit, New York Times, 
April 10, 2005, Business Section at 30:1. 
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The following chart shows the effects of a class action for various combinations of stock held and 
stock bought (assuming a plaintiff class comprising 50% of outstanding shares). 
 
DOLLAR VALUE 
OF SHARES 
HELD 
DOLLAR VALUE 
OF SHARES 
BOUGHT  
RECOVERY NET 
OF 20% 
EXPENSES  
ENDING VALUE 
WITH CLASS 
ACTION 
ENDING VALUE 
WITHOUT 
CLASS ACTION 
2000 0 0 1600 1800 
1500 500 80 1680 1800 
1000 1000 160 1760 1800 
500 1500 240 1840 1800 
0 2000 320 1920 1800 
 
If the plaintiff class comprises 20 percent of the outstanding shares (rather than 50 percent), the 
feedback effect is smaller. The price of the stock will fall by 12.5 percent as a result of feedback 
(rather than by 20 percent as in the previous example). The following chart shows the effects of a 
class action under these circumstances. 
 
 
DOLLAR VALUE 
OF SHARES 
HELD 
DOLLAR VALUE 
OF SHARES 
BOUGHT  
RECOVERY NET 
OF 20% 
EXPENSES  
ENDING VALUE 
WITH CLASS 
ACTION 
ENDING VALUE 
WITHOUT 
CLASS ACTION 
2000 0 0 1750 1800 
1500 500 50 1800 1800 
1000 1000 100 1850 1800 
500 1500 150 1900 1800 
0 2000 200 1950 1800 
 
In this case, an investor will favor prosecution of the class action if he bought more than 500 
shares. In general, as the plaintiff class gets smaller, the feedback effect is reduced, and the 
conflict between buyer-holders and other class members becomes muted. 
 
The assumption in the foregoing discussion has been that portfolio-balancing investors buy 
because the value of the subject shares in their portfolios has declined below some target 
percentage. That can happen in several different ways: (1) the shares may have fallen in value, (2) 
the remainder of the market may have risen in value, or (3) investors may have added cash to their 
portfolios. In addition, there is more than one way to balance a portfolio. It is common (especially 
for larger investors) to hold shares in proportion to market capitalization (or public float). Such an 
investor will be a buyer when the price of the subject stock rises relative to the rest of the market. 
Because of the mix of investor strategies, it is quite possible for portfolio-balancing investors to 
account for a large proportion of the class.23 
                                                 
23 There is a limit on the number of portfolio-balancing investors that can be in the plaintiff class. Assume that 50% of 
the defendant company shares are represented in a class action and that half of those shares are held either by 
undiversified investors or all-or-nothing traders and that the other half is held by portfolio-balancing investors. If we 
assume that a portfolio-balancing investor seeks to hold an equal percentage of each of the shares in his portfolio, then 
investor purchases (on the average) must equal at least one-third of their holdings to account for such a proportion of 
the class. There are no more shares to go around. 
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The Conflict Between Direct and Derivative Actions 
 
There is yet another conflict to consider as between investors who would prefer a class action (with 
individual recovery for investment losses) and investors who would prefer a derivative action (with 
recovery by the corporation for misappropriation). As noted above, a diversified investor would 
favor a derivative action over a class action. An undiversified investor would have no objection to a 
derivative action as long as it does not preclude a class action. Indeed, it is quite common in the 
real world for a class action and a derivative action to proceed side-by-side.24 But the two actions 
are not completely independent of each other. If insiders have misappropriated stockholder wealth, 
the misappropriation constitutes a portion of the investment loss. To be sure, misappropriation is 
likely to account for only a small portion of investment loss. Nevertheless, the recovery for 
misappropriation should reduce the recovery for investment losses dollar for dollar. Moreover, 
because derivative recovery by the corporation benefits all investors – including both buyers and 
holders – buyers may object to netting the derivative recovery from the direct recovery. On the 
other hand, the amount may be quite substantial in some circumstances. For example, the 
controversy may involve a large number of backdated options. Moreover, a derivative action may 
also include a claim that the reputation of the corporation was damaged by the bad faith of insiders 
and that some or much of the investment loss was attributable to such sources. Indeed, a zealous 
derivative plaintiff should seek evidence of any such effect, whereas a class plaintiff has every 
incentive not to do so if there is also a derivative action pending.  
 
This conflict is doubly troubling because the derivative action is in effect a class action on behalf of 
all stockholders whereas the class action is an action on behalf of buyers only some of whom 
would object to certification of the class action but who would favor the prosecution of the 
derivative action. The class action plaintiff is likely to argue that he does not seek to represent 
holders and should not be required to consider their needs and wants. But many in the class may 
be buyer-holders who would object to the class action and favor the derivative action but who 
would not opt out of the class action if it were certified. So it does no good for the representative to 
argue that class members may vote with their feet. Rather he must come up with a manageable 
definition of his class. It is not clear that it is possible to do so where there are possibly many class 
members who would vote against class certification if they could but would nonetheless decline to 
opt out of the class.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
24 It appears that the number of side-by-side derivative actions has increased significantly in recent years. See 
Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Case Filings, 2005: A Year in Review, at 4. 
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The Investor Population 
 
The conflict of interests between diversified investors and undiversified investors and among 
diversified investors who follow differing trading strategies is quite real. About three-quarters of all 
stock (by value) is held by institutions that are invariably diversified.25 This is not at all surprising. 
One would expect most individual investors to invest through institutions, because that is the 
cheapest and easiest way to achieve diversification. It is less clear how much trading is attributable 
to stock picking as opposed to other passive strategies such as portfolio balancing. To be sure, 
even diversified investors may engage in some stock picking as they construct their portfolios. If a 
diversified investor tends to sell all of a losing stock and to buy a wholly new stock when he trades, 
he will not oppose an SFCA if he is a member of the plaintiff class (even though he would favor the 
abolition of SFCAs generally).  
 
Moreover, it is a common strategy for diversified investors to sell winners and losers in tandem in 
order to minimize taxes. To be sure, one might see this as a form of stock picking if one assumes 
that the investor sells all of a given stock and uses the funds to buy another different stock. On the 
other hand, tax law dictates that if one sells a stock to recognize the loss, the funds not be 
reinvested in the same stock. Otherwise the transaction is ignored for tax purposes. 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 According to FRB data, as of year-end 2006 there was outstanding $20.603 trillion in (publicly traded) equity of 
United States companies of which $5.483 trillion was held by households and nonprofit institutions. See Federal 
Reserve Board, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, Table L.213 (Corporate Equities) (March 8, 2007), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/z1.pdf (These figures do not include investment company shares.) 
Historically, nonprofits have accounted for about nine percent of the equity holdings of the household sector. See 
Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, Table L.100.a (Nonprofit Organizations) (March 
8, 2007) (showing annual data for 1988 through 2000). This sector apparently also includes stock held by other 
corporations. But assuming that individual holdings equal 91 percent of the household sector (or about $4.990 trillion), 
non-individuals – institutions – own about $15.135 trillion or about 76 percent of all equities outstanding. Because 
institutions are fiduciaries, they are generally required to diversify under general principles of trust law or more specific 
statutes such as the 40 Act and ERISA. See, e.g., Investment Company Act § 5(b) (investment company may not be 
classified as diversified if it has more than 5 percent of its assets invested in any one issuer). Thus, it seems fair to 
presume that institutions are diversified. FRB data also indicate that about 9.5 of families hold fifteen or more stocks. 
See Brian K. Bucks, et al., Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Evidence from the 2001 and 2004 Survey of 
Consumer Finances, 92 Federal Reserve Bulletin, A1, A15 (February 2006), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2006/financesurvey.pdf  That is a shockingly low number. See William N. 
Goetzmann & Alok Kumar, Why Do Individual Investors Hold Under-Diversified Portfolios? NBER Working Paper, April 
2005. Nevertheless, if such investors are counted as diversified, total holdings of diversified investors are about 
$15.609 trillion. Moreover, individuals ultimately hold the interests in the institutions that hold diversified portfolios. 
Studies indicate that an investor can achieve adequate diversification with as few as 20 different stocks. See Franco 
Modigliani & Gerald A. Pogue, An Introduction to Risk and Return, Fin. Anal. J., March-April 1974, May-June 1974. 
See also James M. Park & Jeremy C. Staum, Diversification: How Much is Enough? (March 13, 1998), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=85428  It is unnecessary for present purposes to know how much diversification is enough. It 
is sufficient to note that it is costless for an investor to diversify and that the risk of securities fraud (like other types of 
company-specific risk) can be eliminated through diversification. Most individual investors diversify by investing in 
mutual funds and similar pooled investment vehicles. Thus, even a very small investor may invest in a fully diversified 
portfolio of 200 to 300 different stocks. To be sure, funds charge a variety of fees in addition to the direct expenses of 
holding and trading portfolio securities. But there are comparable fees and expenses involved in maintaining an 
individual account. 
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It is also quite common for investors to engage in dollar cost averaging. That is a roundabout way 
of saying that they invest over time as they accumulate savings. Such a strategy is also consistent 
with portfolio balancing. Indeed, unless a dollar cost averaging investor chooses new stocks for 
each new addition of cash to his portfolio, he effectively also engages in portfolio balancing by 
default. 
 
Recent studies estimate that in the United States in the years since 2000 only about 24 percent of 
all trading is motivated by stock picking.26 And that figure appears to be on the decline.27 Of the 76 
percent of trading that is motivated other than by stock picking, it appears that as much as two-
thirds is motivated by portfolio balancing strategies.28  
 
II. CLASS ACTION REQUIREMENTS 
 
The conflict of interests between diversified investors and undiversified investors and among 
various diversified investors who follow varying trading strategies poses a serious problem for class 
action certification. Indeed, the conflict is so fundamental (and unmanageable) that the courts 
should decline to certify securities fraud class actions that seek damages on behalf of individual 
investors. 
 
                                                 
26 See Utpal Bhattacharya & Neal E. Galpin, Is Stock Picking Declining Around the World? AFA 2007 Chicago 
Meetings Paper (November 2005), http://ssrn.com/abstract=849627 (finding that about three-quarters of trading is 
motivated other than by stock picking); Martijn Cremers & Jianping Mei, Turning Over Turnover, Yale ICF Working 
Paper No. 03-26, AFA 2005 Philadelphia Meetings (November 2004), http://ssrn.com/abstract=452720. See also Meir 
Statman, et al., Investor Overconfidence and Trading Volume, AFA 2004 San Diego Meetings (March 2003), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=168472 But see Martijn Cremers & Antti Petajisto, How Active is Your Fund Manager? A New 
Measure that Predicts Performance, AFA 2007 Chicago Meetings Paper (January 15, 2007), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=891719 (finding that more active managers of nonindex funds outperform less active 
managers). For a treatment of trading frequency from a legal point of view, see Paul G. Mahoney, Is There a Cure for 
"Excessive" Trading?, 81 Va. L. Rev. 713 (1995). See also Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? 
Disagreement, Market Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 Va. L. Rev. 611 (1995); Lynn A. Stout, Reply: Agreeing to 
Disagree over Excessive Trading, 81 Va. L. Rev. 751 (1995). 
 
27  Bhattacharya and Galpin also find that in the United States in the 1960s about 60 percent of trading was motivated 
by stock picking. They also predict that the level of stock picking will continue to decline and stabilize at about 11 
percent. It is not surprising that securities fraud class actions became established at a time when most investors 
focused on company-specific factors. See Utpal Bhattacharya & Neal E. Galpin, Is Stock Picking Declining Around the 
World? AFA 2007 Chicago Meetings Paper (November 2005), http://ssrn.com/abstract=849627 It is possible that the 
mix of investors varies from one corporation to the next. For example, it is possible that a particular corporation may 
attract the disproportionate attention of stock pickers. But for most companies, most trading appears to be motivated by 
other factors. 
 
28 Indeed the proportion of portfolio balancing trades is likely quite higher. NYSE data indicates that for most weeks of 
2007 program trading accounted for about one-third of volume (on a twice total volume (TTV) basis) with a high of 49% 
and low of 29%. And in many cases the opposite side of the trade would have been taken by a specialist or market 
maker. See http://www.nyse.com/press/12_2007.html  
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Under Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) a class action may be maintained 
only if: 
 
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are 
questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the 
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the 
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class (emphasis 
added). 
 
In addition, FRCP Rule 23(b)(3), which governs actions for damages, requires that:  
 
the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action 
is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the 
controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of 
the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the 
extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or 
against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the 
litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in 
the management of a class action (emphasis added). 
 
FRCP 23 requires that an action must be certified as class action at an early practicable time. That 
is, the trial court must determine that the action is an appropriate one to be handled as a class 
action. If not the action reverts to an individual action on behalf of the named plaintiffs. 
 
In practice, the courts have not strictly applied the requirements of Rule 23. But the Second Circuit 
recently ruled that a trial court must determine that all of the requirements for a class action have 
been met in order to certify the class. It is not enough for the trial court to find that there has been 
some showing that the action satisfies the standards set forth in Rule 23. Rather the court must 
find by a preponderance of the evidence – that it is more likely than not – that the action satisfies 
the requirements of Rule 23.29 As the Second Circuit stated: 
 
A district judge is to [sic] assess all of the relevant evidence admitted at the class 
certification stage and determine whether each Rule 23 requirement has been met, just as 
the judge would resolve a dispute about any other threshold prerequisite for continuing a 
lawsuit. Finally, we decline to follow the dictum in Heerwagen suggesting that a district 
judge may not weigh conflicting evidence and determine the existence of a Rule 23 
requirement just because that requirement is identical to an issue on the merits.30 
 
                                                 
29 In re Initial Public Offering Securities (IPO) Litigation, 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006). See also Oscar Private Equity 
Investments v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 11525 (5th Cir. 2007); Regents of the 
University of California v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372; 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 6396 (5th Cir. 
2007). 
30  In re IPO Securities Litigation, 471 F.3d at 42. See also Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 2007 US LEXIS 
8270. 
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In other words, according to the Second Circuit, the courts must take seriously the requirements of 
Rule 23 in deciding whether an action may proceed as a class action. Few securities fraud actions 
are likely to pass muster.31 
 
Adequate Representation 
 
One of the four requirements that must be met in all class actions (whether or not for damages) is 
that the named plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Given their 
conflicting interests, it is impossible for a stock-picking investor to be an adequate representative 
for a portfolio-balancing investor or vice versa. A portfolio-balancing investor would not likely file a 
class action in the first place, and if later designated as the representative plaintiff, he would seek 
to have the action dismissed or decertified. To be sure, this would be a peculiar turn of events. 
Presumably, the plaintiff files the action because he wants compensation for his losses.32 And in a 
sense, the action belongs to the plaintiff who files it. But under PSLRA, the court must designate 
the lead plaintiff and must ordinarily designate the class member with the most at stake (if that 
class member wants the job).33 Similarly, an undiversified investor cannot be an adequate 
representative for a portfolio-balancing investor because an undiversified investor would 
presumably proceed with the action contrary to the interests of portfolio-balancing diversified 
investors.34 
                                                 
31 See also Oscar Private Equity Investments v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 11525 
(5th Cir. 2007); Regents of the University of California v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372; 2007 
U.S. App. LEXIS 6396 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 
32 On the other hand, the recent controversies about paying class action plaintiffs (which led to the indictment of 
William Lerach, Melvyn Weiss, and others) suggests otherwise. See Richard A. Booth, Why Pay a Fraud Plaintiff to 
Sue?, washingtonpost.com, June 26, 2006. 
 
33 Incidentally, this suggests that the courts should favor the interests of the most numerous population of stockholders, 
namely, diversified stockholders and indeed portfolio-balancing diversified stockholders. 
 
34 It is not clear how the courts would react to a representative plaintiff who sought dismissal or decertification. As a 
matter of procedure, a prospective representative plaintiff must seek the job and must presumably disclose to the court 
any plan to oppose certification or seek dismissal. That would clearly bear on whether the prospective representative 
could fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class. In effect, the court would be required to decide whether 
to certify the class at the same time that it appoints the representative plaintiff even though ordinarily the representative 
plaintiff is responsible for filing the motion to certify. On the other hand, if the case involves allegations of 
misappropriation, the appointment of the representative plaintiff might turn on the question whether to characterize the 
action as a class action (direct action) or derivative action. Moreover, a derivative action is always a possible outcome 
because even in the absence of misappropriation, one can always sue the directors and officers for breach of the duty 
of candor and consequent damage to the reputation of the corporation if there is an actionable failure of disclosure that 
can support a claim arising under federal securities law. Leaving aside questions unique to derivative actions (such as 
whether demand has been made on the board of directors), it is not clear that a court must choose between the two 
(despite the argument here). So it seems likely that most courts would permit both actions to proceed out of an 
abundance of caution. In short, it is not clear how one could prevail on a court to decide how to characterize the action 
at the time the representative plaintiff is appointed if there is misappropriation involved even though it is arguably more 
important to do so in such a case. Ironically, it would seem much easier for a prospective representative who opposes 
to certification to prevail over one who favors certification because the alternatives are mutually exclusive. On the other 
hand, the court might well opt for the prospective representative who favors certification on the theory that the 
defendant will argue against certification. But that alternative effectively assumes the conclusion that (begs the 
question whether) the representative plaintiff is in fact representative. It is equivalent to gerrymandering the class to 
include only those who would favor the action and suggests that the real question is whether common questions 
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Traditionally, the courts have been unreceptive to the argument that a representative plaintiff might 
seek to undermine the claims of some class members.35 In most cases, it is difficult to see how one 
subgroup would gain from a loss by another subgroup. At worst, the representative plaintiff might 
seek to emphasize the losses suffered during a particular part of the class period, increasing  
damages for some investors and decreasing damages for others depending on when they bought 
the subject stock.36 On the other hand, the federal courts have generally recognized that one 
individual cannot serve as the representative plaintiff in both a class action (direct action) and a 
derivative action.37  
 
The conflict between diversified and undiversified investors is fundamentally different from the 
somewhat worrisome possibility that a representative plaintiff might seek to shift around the 
damages within the class period. Rather the conflict is between investor classes that would want 
the action to go forward and those that would prefer to see it dismissed or converted into a 
derivative action.   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
predominate. One might think that defendant companies themselves would advocate the conversion of SFCAs into 
derivative actions. One problem with that strategy is that directors and officers insurance does not cover derivative 
claims. 
 
35 See Parker Freeland v. Iridium World Communications, Ltd., 233 F.R.D. 40 (D.D.C. 2006), citing In re Gaming 
Lottery Sec. Litig., 58 F. Supp. 2d 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). See also In re Baan Co. Sec. Litig., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
27875 (D.D.C. 2002); In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc. Sec. Litig., 191 F.R.D. 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); In re Lucent Techs. 
Inc. Sec. Litig., 194 F.R.D. 137 (D.N.J. 2000). But see In re Seagate Tech. II Sec. Litig., 843 F. Supp. 1341 (N.D. Cal. 
1994). 
 
36 Judicial skepticism about intraclass conflicts may be the result of implicit recognition that plaintiff lawyers will 
invariably seek to maximize aggregate damages. 
 
37 See Zarowitz v. BankAmerica Corp., 866 F.2d 1164 (9th Cir. 1989) (plaintiff could not serve as derivative plaintiff 
where his interest in increasing the value of his stock "through a larger derivative suit recovery is dwarfed by his 
interest in pursuing his litigation with the Bank"); Owen v. Modern Diversified Ind., Inc., 643 F.2d 441 (6th Cir. 1981) 
(plaintiff could not serve as derivative plaintiff where there was "a strong possibility that [the] derivative action would be 
used merely as a device to obtain leverage" in plaintiff's individual suit); Davis v. Comed, Inc., 619 F.2d 588, 593-94 
(6th Cir. 1980); Ryan v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 765 F. Supp. 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Kamerman v. Steinberg, 113 F.R.D. 
511 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (class certification denied where plaintiffs also brought derivative claims); Horowitz v. Pownall, 
582 F. Supp. 665, 666 (D. Md. 1984) (finding conflict where "the proposed class and plaintiff would be in direct 
competition with each other for the damages that the directors and officers would be required to pay in compensation 
for their illegal actions"); Petersen v. Federated Development Co., 416 F. Supp. 466 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (assumption that 
plaintiff bringing individual and derivative claims cannot fairly represent shareholders); Caan v. Kane-Miller Corp., 1974 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13019 (S.D.N.Y., 1974) (individual and derivative actions may not be maintained simultaneously); 
Ruggiero v. American Bioculture, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (class and derivative actions may not be pursued 
simultaneously). But see  Mayer v. Development Corp. of America, 396 F. Supp. 917, 931 (D. Del. 1975) (individual 
action against corporation is not absolute bar to derivative action). See also Principe v. Ukropina (In re Pacific Enters. 
Sec. Litig.), 47 F.3d 373 (9th Cir. 1995) (expressing concern in connection with approval of settlement about law 
Milberg Weiss firm’s dual representation of class and derivative plaintiffs). Interestingly, Delaware courts have had little 
trouble with this conflict in actions arising under state corporation law. Compare Colonial Sec. Corp. v. Allen, 1983 Del. 
Ch. LEXIS 393; Youngman v. Tahmoush, 457 A.2d 376 (Del. Ch. 1983) with SCOPAS TECH. CO. v. LORD, 1984 Del. 
Ch. LEXIS 556 (interest in his personal claims outweighed his interest in pursuing the derivative action with the same 
vigor as the personal claims). 
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The problems with adequacy of representation standing alone should be enough to deny 
certification. But they are not the only problems that arise under FRCP 23(b)(3).  
 
Subclasses and Manageability 
 
The usual way to fix the problem of conflicting interests is to form subclasses each with its own 
representative plaintiff. But subclasses are no solution to the conflicts inherent in securities fraud 
class actions.  
 
Based on the foregoing discussion there are arguably three subclasses that should be formed in 
any securities fraud class action. Class I consists of undiversified investors. Class II consists of 
diversified investors who trade all-or-nothing when they trade. Class III consists of diversified 
portfolio-balancing investors who are buyer-holders. Although Class II would favor the abolition of 
SFCAs generally, they would nevertheless favor individual class actions in which they are 
members of the plaintiff class.38 As for Class III, most class members would likely oppose 
certification (because they would likely lose more from a successful action than they would gain), 
but they would want to join in the class action if it is certified. 
 
The first problem that a court must address is how to define the subclasses. Whether an investor 
should be deemed to be a member of one class or the other would presumably depend on the 
extent to which the investor is diversified and his trading habits. It seems likely that the universe of 
investors will be distributed along a continuum from those who own a single stock to those who are 
effectively indexed. It is difficult to say where one should draw the line.39 As for trading habits, it 
seems likely that many investors will engage in some portfolio balancing and some all-or-nothing 
trading (if only for tax purposes).40  
 
The named plaintiff might argue -- consistent with case law -- that he seeks only to represent the 
interests of buyers and that he does not seek to represent buyer-holders who might object to the 
class action and favor a derivative action. In other words, he might argue that he seeks only to 
serve the interests of buyer-holders as buyers. To the contrary, FRCP 23 requires that the named 
                                                 
38 On the other hand, some Class II members may vote against the class action if the cost of filing a claim is likely to 
exceed the recovery. Interestingly, it appears that mutual funds and other institutional investors often forgo the 
opportunity to file claims in successful securities fraud class actions. See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Leaving 
Money on the Table: Do Institutional Investors Fail to File Claims in Securities Class Actions?, 80 Wash. U. L.Q. 855, 
855 (2002). Although one might be tempted to argue that this constitutes some kind of evidence that institutional 
investors have recognized that securities fraud class actions are counterproductive, the fact is that failure to file a claim 
when others file is irrational (irrespective of whether one favors SFCAs) and amounts to a subsidy running from funds 
to claimants. On the other hand, it may be that mutual fund investments tend to be concentrated in particular stocks 
and that failure to file a claim is more common in cases in which most other investors are also mutual funds, 
suggesting a form of consciously parallel behavior. See Adam C. Pritchard, Who Cares? 80 Wash. U. L.Q. 883 (2002) 
(replying to Cox and Thomas). In any event, there has been a flurry of lawsuits recently against mutual funds that failed 
to file claims in SFCAs. See Jonathan D. Glater, Suits Contend Mutual Funds Fail to Collect in Settlements, New York 
Times, January 19, 2005 at C1. 
 
39 The question is how much diversification is enough? 
 
40 It would likely be necessary to conduct extensive discovery of potential class members to determine who should be 
in what class. In the end, these factors would likely render the action unmanageable and preclude class certification. 
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plaintiff represent the interests of the plaintiff class. Indeed, the courts have held that a 
representative plaintiff is a fiduciary.41 It follows that the named plaintiff may not ignore the interests 
of class members simply because some are inconsistent with others. Similarly, it is difficult to see 
how a class action may legitimately proceed if the class is gerrymandered to exclude class 
members with inconvenient interests. 
 
The named plaintiff might also argue that anyone who objects to the class action can opt out. The 
problem is that those opposed to certification will remain in the action if it is certified. If the action is 
successful, those who opt out effectively pay those who remain in the action, but they receive none 
of the benefit. So it does no good to argue that class members may vote with their feet by opting 
out.  
 
The formation of subclasses gives rise to further problems.  
 
First, Class I consists of undiversified investors who are by definition stock pickers. A stock-picker 
presumably considers company-specific fundamentals in making an investment decision and 
should be required to prove reliance.42 In contrast, a diversified investor cares little about company-
specific fundamentals. She is a price-taker who relies on the integrity of the market. The logic of 
fraud on the market applies only to diversified investors. Accordingly, a court could properly certify 
Class II or Class III (who would really rather see the action dismissed), but it should not certify 
Class I.43  
 
Second, Class III (buyer-holders) would prefer that its representative plaintiff prosecute a derivative 
action (to recover for misappropriation and damages) rather than a class action (to recover 
individual investment losses). But a derivative action benefits all stockholders. For purposes of a 
derivative action, the subclass of diversified investors should include undiversified stockholders.44 
                                                 
41 See, e.g., City of San Jose v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 12 Cal. 3d 447 (1974); Heckmann v. 
Ahmanson, 168 Cal.App.3d 119 (1985). 
 
42 See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). It is ironic that the Supreme Court decision in Basic – which more 
or less gave rise to the modern securities fraud class action by accepting the idea of fraud on the market – is most 
consistent with a portfolio-balancing investor as a model and that a portfolio-balancing investor would likely oppose 
most class actions. Thus, the Basic doctrine more or less self-destructs. 
 
43 See In Re Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation, 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006). Even though they are diversified, 
Class II (diversified investors who trade all-or-nothing) may be seen as engaging in a form of stock picking that is 
somewhat inconsistent with a philosophy of diversification. On the other hand, a diversified investor is free to engage in 
some stock-picking with impunity. Although one cannot expect to beat the market with any consistency, neither is one 
likely to be beaten by the market if one is well diversified. 
 
44 There is some authority for individual recovery in a derivative action. See Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (CA2 
1955). But such a remedy seems to be limited to situations in which wrongdoers would otherwise recover for their own 
wrongdoing. Id. And influential courts have questioned the idea even in such circumstances. See Bangor Punta 
Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R. Co., 417 U.S. 703 (1974). Individual recovery would accomplish little unless 
members of the direct class can be excluded. Moreover (and more to the point), the representative plaintiff in a 
derivative action should seek to maximize derivative damages and (implicitly) to minimize class action damages. 
Presumably the derivative class will always be larger than the direct class (barring the requirement of some sort of 
election between the two with individual recovery). Thus, the derivative action will tend to dilute recovery in the direct 
action. 
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On the other hand, if undiversified investors are permitted to proceed with a class action, 
diversified investors will want to join the plaintiff class even though they would really prefer that the 
class action be dropped altogether. In short, subclasses are unstable in this setting. 
 
The problems with subclasses are even more apparent if one considers the practicalities of notice. 
In a class action for damages under FRCP 23(b)(3), class members must be given notice of the 
action and must be given the opportunity to opt out. FRCP 23(c)(2) (B) provides: 
 
For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must direct to class members the 
best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members 
who can be identified through reasonable effort. The notice must concisely and clearly 
state in plain, easily understood language: (1) the nature of the action, (2) the definition of 
the class certified, (3) the class claims, issues, or defenses, (4) that a class member may 
enter an appearance through counsel if the member so desires, (5) that the court will 
exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion, stating when and how 
members may elect to be excluded, and (6) the binding effect of a class judgment on class 
members under Rule 23(c)(3). 
 
The rule does not specify when or how notice must be given or who must pay for it. In most cases, 
notice will not go out until after the court has heard an (unsuccessful) motion to dismiss the action 
and a (successful) motion to certify the action.45  
 
In most cases, the parties attempt to identify investors who have purchased stock during the class 
period and to limit notice to such investors (if only to minimize expenses).46 But it is arguable that 
notice should go to all stockholders who held stock as of the end of the class period because one 
possible outcome is that the court will convert the action into a derivative action.47  
 
Presumably the notice should include an explanation of why one would choose one class or the 
other (and maybe even a copy of this article).48 There is no way to know in advance how many 
investors will fall into each class.49 Some investors may choose to remain in all three classes by 
                                                 
45 Presumably, the motions to dismiss will also include a motion by a special litigation committee (SLC) of the board of 
directors to dismiss the derivative action. This motion may entail some delay because the SLC must conduct an 
investigation into the merits of the action.   
 
46 In most cases, it is also necessary to notify investors who bought and sold during the class period because (for 
example) they may have suffered a loss that is attributable to a leak of the bad news.  
 
47 Notice is not required under such circumstances but it is permitted. Notice is required only for actions seeking 
damages payable to individual class members. 
 
48 Although FRCP 23 says nothing about class members choosing classes, the right to opt out may amount to the 
same thing.  
 
49 One of the intractable problems with SFCAs is that there is no way to know how many different shares have been 
damaged because many of the same shares may have been bought and sold during the class period. As in a game of 
musical chairs, many players may change position, even though only one comes up short. See generally Robert A. 
Alessi, The Emerging Judicial Hostility to the Typical Damages Model Employed by Plaintiffs in Securities Class Action 
Lawsuits, 56 Bus. Law. 483 (2001). In short, under current practice the courts do not usually know how many shares 
are represented by the plaintiff class (or thus the aggregate amount of damages that would be awarded if the plaintiff 
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declining to opt out of any class.50 Theoretically, the court could require potential class members to 
choose one and only one class, but that would be inconsistent with the possibility that the action 
would be converted into a derivative action that is effectively prosecuted on behalf of all 
stockholders regardless of the class they declare.51 It might also be seen as a thinly veiled device 
to convert the action into an opt-in class action. FRCP 23(b)(3) contemplates only opt-out actions, 
which the courts have interpreted to prohibit opt-in class actions. Moreover, if the action proceeds 
as a derivative action, it does not really matter whether a stockholder chooses that class. 
Accordingly, savvy investors may strategically opt out of Class III because there is nothing to lose 
by doing so.  
 
On the other hand, it might be possible to deem failure to submit a claim as an election to opt out of 
the action. Although such a device skates close to the edge of converting the action into an opt-in 
action, class members will eventually be required to submit claims. It is difficult to see how 
requiring such claims to be submitted sooner rather than later would be prejudicial. Indeed, such a 
procedure would have the advantage of collecting necessary information about the extent of claims 
and would discourage strategic behavior on the part of investors.  
 
Undoubtedly, the plaintiff bar (or least those who make a living from SFCAs) will object that class 
members might be reluctant to respond if they do not know how much money is involved. 
Moreover, if failure to respond is deemed to constitute a decision to opt out of the class action, and 
a large number of investors fail to respond, the court could decline to certify the action. Then again, 
even if the action has been certified as a class action, the court retains the power to decertify the 
action. And one of the recognized grounds for doing so is that a large number of class members 
have chosen to opt out.52 
                                                                                                                                                 
wins). A fortiori, it would not seem necessary for the court to know know up front how many investors compose each 
subclass. Needless to say, ignorance of the potential damages makes settlement negotiations difficult. It has also led 
to the invention of some highly questionable models that purport to estimate the number of damaged shares. See id. 
Alessi argues that notice should go out and that class members should be required to file claims (together with 
documentation) before the court approves any settlement because that is the only way to determine accurately the 
number of damaged shares. It seems odd that such is not the usual practice anyway. One would think that a class 
member should be required to declare before knowing the outcome. But that might necessitate the expense of notice 
on two occasions – once to solicit claim forms and (possibly) a second time to approve the settlement. Indeed it has 
become a common practice in class actions outside SFCAs to send multiple rounds of notice. 
 
50 There is some precedent for overlapping classes in other settings such as civil rights cases in which there may be 
subclasses of women and African-Americans with many who are members of both classes. The courts have not 
generally found such overlap to be problematic as long as each subclass is adequately represented. 
 
51 To be more precise, a derivative action benefits stockholders who continue to hold the stock on the date of judgment 
(or some earlier date when it becomes apparent how the litigation will turn out). A derivative action confers no benefit 
on an investor who has sold her shares. Thus, one conceivable argument for the status quo is that SFCAs allocate 
compensation to the stockholders who were in fact damaged by the fraud (including those who have sold their shares 
in the meantime). On the other hand, if derivative actions became the norm, the market would likely anticipate the 
outcome and compensate investors accordingly as of the date of corrective disclosure or shortly thereafter (not to 
mention eliminating the adverse effects of feedback).  
 
52 If a large number of plaintiff class members choose to opt out of the class action, that is presumably a good 
indication that the class action is not superior to other ways of resolving the dispute or at least that the class members 
themselves do not see it as so. It is not clear that the court must look into why so many potential class members have 
opted out. The fact seems to speak for itself. This suggests that it might be appropriate to poll the potential class to 
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Competing Litigation 
 
One of the four factors to be considered by a court in connection with a class action for damages 
under Rule 23(b)(3) is: (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy 
already commenced by or against members of the class. Although this factor has rarely mattered 
much, it could be quite significant if a court attempted to form subclasses and one of the 
subclasses sought to prosecute a derivative action rather than a class action for damages.  
 
Again, a diversified investor would usually prefer a derivative action rather than a class action. But 
if the action is filed as a class action, can the court convert it into a derivative action? 53 The answer 
is quite clearly yes. 
 
First, the characterization of an action is a matter for the court. It is not up to the representative 
plaintiff to decide what form the action will take.54 
 
Second, FRCP 23 itself seems to contemplate both types of actions. To be sure, FRCP 23.1 
expressly addresses derivative actions. But FRCP 23(b)(2) also speaks to the issue in that it states 
that a class action may be maintained if: 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
determine if a class action should proceed as a class action or as a derivative action. Such a vote of the potential 
plaintiff class (including all subclasses) would be a better way to get an accurate reading of investor preferences than 
the opt-out system. With a vote, potential class members could register their preferences without the need to sacrifice 
class membership if the action goes forward. That is, a diversified investor could vote NO in the hope that the action 
will be dismissed. If the action goes forward, he may remain in the class and get his share of any recovery. If the only 
choice is to opt out, one must take the risk that others will choose to remain in the action. Then one must commence 
an individual action to get a share of the pot. But in most cases the expense of doing so will far outweigh the potential 
recovery. In short, voting would be much more sensible than the opt-out system we have. For a discussion of similar 
advantages in connection with stockholder voting as compared tender offers as a way of assessing stockholder 
preferences, see Richard A. Booth, The Promise of State Takeover Statutes, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 1635 (1988); Richard A. 
Booth, The New Law of Freeze-Out Mergers, 49 Mo. L. Rev. 517 (1984). One potential problem with voting is that 
under FRCP 23 only buyers may be class members in an action for damages, and a court might well limit the vote to 
potential class members. Moreover, a diversified investor who is opposed in principle to SFCAs may nonetheless vote 
FOR an individual class action because he gets to vote only when he might gain from the action. Indeed, a diversified 
investor may figure that he really must vote in favor of the class action (painful as it is to do so) because other 
diversified investors (who may not understand their interests so well) will vote in favor of other actions in which they 
stand to gain. So even if the matter is put up to a vote, many investors will vote YES even though they oppose class 
actions in principle because they must remain in the actions for which they are eligible in order to recoup the losses he 
suffers from actions in which he is not a class member. On the other hand, buyer-holders will likely vote against the 
class action. The one group that will invariably vote against a class action are (non-buyer) holders. But it is not clear 
that they can vote unless the vote is one of all potential class members including those who might be class members 
(so to speak) in a derivative action. One way that the vote could be conducted would be to permit all stockholders to 
vote either for a class action or a derivative action. Although nonvoters might complicate the results by affording in 
effect a third alternative of no action, non-votes (or abstentions) could safely be ignored since a stockholder may 
always file a derivative action anyway. 
 
53 The question is somewhat academic in that there is nothing to stop a diversified investor from filing a derivative 
action wholly independent of a pending class action. 
 
54 See Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1033 (Del. 2004). 
 
 23 
the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to 
the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory 
relief with respect to the class as a whole. 
 
A derivative action is really two actions in one: an equitable action to compel the corporation to sue 
and an action by the corporation (usually at law) seeking damages or restitution from those who did 
the corporation wrong. Thus, FRCP 23 apparently overlaps with FRCP 23.1. 
 
The question is: Should the court certify an action under Rule 23(b)(3) when it could also certify an 
action under Rule 23(b)(2)? Clearly, a derivative action represents the greater number of 
stockholders in that it represents both buyers and holders. To be sure, under Blue Chip Stamps 
holders have no standing to sue for damages and thus may not be class members in an action for 
damages. But a holder may maintain a derivative action. Indeed only a holder may maintain a 
derivative action.  
 
It is also arguable that the derivative action is the default rule. In other words, the burden is on the 
party that would maintain a class action to show why it should not be maintained as a derivative 
action.55 
 
To be sure, a derivative action does not afford any remedy to buyers for investment losses. But it is 
not clear that there should be any such remedy. Again, such a remedy comes at the expense of 
holders. And the courts have been generally dismissive of arguments that a representative plaintiff 
might seek to undermine the claims of some class members, because in most cases it is difficult to 
see how one subgroup would gain from a loss by another subgroup. But as shown above, the 
conflict between diversified and undiversified investors is different. 
 
In contrast, both buyers and holders benefit from a derivative action. To be sure, the recovery is 
likely to be smaller in a derivative action because the amount at issue is likely to be smaller and 
because the recovery is spread over a larger number of stockholders. Moreover, buyers effectively 
recoup some of their losses because there is no feedback effect in a derivative action as there is in 
a class action. Again, if the plaintiff class is 50 percent of the stockholders, the feedback effect will 
double the price decrease. So if such an action is styled as a derivative action rather than a class 
action, buyers effectively recover half their losses anyway. 
 
So the question is which class to favor. The answer is quite easy. In case of conflict, the law should 
favor diversified investors. First, it is clear that diversified investors constitute the larger population 
of investors.56 Second, investors should be presumed to be diversified. It is irrational for passive 
investors – most investors – not to diversify because by doing so one can eliminate the company-
specific risk that goes with picking stocks and investing in individual companies without any 
reduction in expected return. The ultimate goal for an investor is to maximize return at a given level 
of risk. It is therefore irrational for an investor to fail to reduce risk if it is costless to do so.  
 
                                                 
55 See Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1033 (Del. 2004).  
 
56 See note 23 supra. 
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Federal securities law is intended to protect reasonable investors.57 Reasonable investors diversify. 
It follows that investors should be presumed to be diversified.58 If there is a need to choose, the 
choice is clear. The law should presume that a reasonable investor is a diversified investor. The 
interests of diversified investors should trump those of undiversified investors.59  
 
Forum Issues 
 
One final consideration follows from the conclusion that a derivative action for misappropriation or 
damages is superior to a class action: Such actions based as they are on fiduciary duty are much 
more appropriate to state court than they are to federal court. One of the four factors listed in 
FRCP 23(b)(3) is (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in 
the particular forum. As I have argued elsewhere, the Delaware Court of Chancery – which is the 
court where most such actions would be litigated – is uniquely well suited to such litigation 
precisely because it is a court of equity.60 Accordingly, the federal courts should defer to the state 
courts in cases sounding primarily in fiduciary duty. 
                                                 
57 See TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976). Denying a remedy to undiversified investors creates 
an added incentive to diversify. Thus, it may be more accurate to characterize the effect as eliminating a subsidy for 
undiversified investors. On the other hand, many courts have permitted action against trustees for losses on imprudent 
investments even though the losses are more than offset by gains from other investments and even though trust law 
requires diversification. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 213 (1959). See generally Jeffrey N. Gordon, The 
Puzzling Persistence of the Constrained Prudent Investor Rule, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 52 (1987) (criticizing the so-called 
anti-netting rule). 
 
58 One might even say that federal securities law should ignore the interests of undiversified investors just as the 
definition of materiality ignores the interests of stockholders who merely might be interested in the disclosure of a 
particular item of information. See TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976). One could also argue 
that an investor who voluntarily assumes unnecessary risk by failing to diversify when possible should be denied a 
remedy on grounds similar to assumption of risk in tort. But as I have argued elsewhere, such an investor might have a 
claim against her broker or investment adviser. See Richard A. Booth, The Suitability Rule, Investor Diversification, and 
Using Spread to Measure Risk, 54 Bus. Law. 1599 (1999) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=200388 
See also Richard A. Booth, Damages in Churning Cases, 20 Sec. Reg. L. J. 3 (1992) (discussing measure of damages 
in investor disputes with brokers). This is not to say that an undiversified investor should have no remedy if she is a 
victim of securities fraud. Some investors are rationally undiversified. For example, it is not irrational for an investor 
who seeks to exercise control over the issuer through the ownership of stock to fail to diversify. But such an investor 
has no need for a class action. Moreover, if such an investor has a claim it is likely to be one against a counterparty to 
a purchase or sale and not one against the issuer. The point here is that a class action by masses of passive investors 
against the issuer makes no sense. 
 
59 The situation is different in a good news case where the plaintiff class consists of sellers. Sellers are no longer 
stockholders and thus cannot maintain a derivative action. But good news cases are much less common than bad 
news cases in large part because they give rise to negative feedback that has the effect of muting the price increase 
that goes with the disclosure of good news. Again in a bad news case, the prospect of payout to buyers reduces the 
value of the defendant company and magnifies the potential award to the plaintiff class. In a good news case, where 
the price rises, the prospect of payout reduces the price increase to a minimum of half what it would otherwise be. 
Again, diversified investors need no remedy in such circumstances because gains and losses wash out over time. 
They would be better off in a world without class actions. But it is not nearly so troublesome to afford a class action 
remedy in such circumstances. After all, the buyers in such a case will enjoy a windfall and should not object too 
strenuously to giving up a part of it. 
 
60 See Richard A. Booth, The Missing Link Between Insider Trading and Securities Fraud, 3 J. Bus. Tech. L. 185 
(2007), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=975949.    
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Conclusion 
 
Securities fraud class actions (SFCAs) arising under Rule 10b-5 are well established as a feature 
of the legal landscape, but they are a vestige of a largely outdated view of investor behavior and 
preferences. In the 1960s, most investors were undiversified stock pickers. Today, most investors 
hold stock through well diversified institutions. As a result, most investors are net losers from 
SFCAs. Moreover, it is arguable that it is irrational for most investors not to be diversified. A 
passive investor who fails to diversify assumes unnecessary risk for the same expected return that 
diversified investors enjoy. Given that federal securities law is intended to protect reasonable 
investors, it follows that it should be interpreted and applied consistent with the interests of 
diversified investors where the interests of diversified and undiversified investors diverge. For a 
diversified investor, gains and losses from securities fraud net out over time. But they lose to the 
extent of attorney fees and they lose when they are holders (which is most of the time) to the 
extent that defendant companies must compensate purchasers. In short, diversified investors 
would prefer that SFCAs be abolished. The one exception arises when insiders gain from the fraud 
such as by selling their shares before the release of bad news. But the appropriate remedy in such 
a case is a derivative action by which the company recovers from the wrongdoers. 
 
The thesis here is that the courts should decline to certify securities fraud actions as class actions 
under FRCP 23 because of the conflicting interests of class members. Undiversified stock pickers 
– usually a minority of the plaintiff class – may favor SFCAs. But many diversified investors – 
particularly those who follow a portfolio balancing strategy – would prefer that the courts refuse to 
certify such actions as class actions because such investors usually lose more on stock they hold 
than they gain on stock they bought during the class period. To be sure, many diversified investors 
(including institutional investors) engage in some stock picking (although some such as index funds 
eschew it altogether). Such an investor might favor certification of actions in which he has bought a 
large amount of the subject stock during the class period relative to preexisting holdings even 
though the same investor would favor the abolition of SFCAs generally. Moreover, not even a strict 
portfolio balancing investor who would oppose certification because she loses more on stock she 
holds than she gains on stock she bought would dare to opt out of the SFCA if it is certified. Thus, 
it does no good for the courts to rely on investors to vote with their feet. Investors who opt out of 
the action effectively pay those who stay in by forgoing compensation for their losses. The bottom 
line is that the courts should refuse to certify securities fraud actions as class actions unless it is 
shown that the plaintiff class is composed wholly of undiversified investors. If the action involves 
allegations that insiders have somehow gained from the fraud or that the corporation itself has 
been damaged by the fraud, the action should proceed as a derivative action. And given that a 
derivative action is a form of class action, it is quite clear that the courts have the power under 
FRCP 23 (and FRCP 23.1) to recast any purported SFCA in such terms. 
 
This is not to say that individual investors should not continue to have standing to sue under Rule 
10b-5. Indeed, an investor who seeks to gain control or influence over a target company is likely to 
be undiversified. If such an investor suffers a fraud in connection with his purchase of target stock, 
he has standing to sue the wrongdoers if he can make out a claim. Nor does the argument here 
imply that there is a fundamental problem with remedies under the 1933 Act. In essence, the 1933 
Act provides for disgorgement by issuers in cases in which they have effectively misappropriated 
capital from the market by false pretenses. Similarly, in the context of an SFCA under Rule 10b-5 
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in which insiders have gained from misappropriation (such as insider trading) during the fraud 
period or have visited loss on the issuer by damage to reputation or otherwise, the appropriate 
remedy if for the issuer to seek compensation. In other words, the approach advocated here is 
wholly consistent with the general scheme of federal securities law.   
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APPENDIX 
 
BAD NEWS CASE 
 
PRE-DISCLOSURE MARKET VALUE (10M shares)                         $100M = 10/share 
 
POST-DISCLOSURE THEORETICAL VALUE                                           90M = 9/share 
 
DAMAGES TO BUYERS (60% absolute turnover)                             6M = .60/share 
 
NET MARKET VALUE POST (tentative)                                           90M − 6M = 84M = 8.40/share 
 
But if market value post is 84M, then damages should be 16M x .60 = 9.6M. 
Now market value post is 90M less 9.6M = 81.4M = 8.14/share. 
Process repeats to limit of $15M in total damages to buyers. 
 
DAMAGES TO BUYERS                                                   15M / 600K shares = $2.50/share 
 
NET TO HOLDERS                                                     90M − 15M = 75M = $7.50/share 
 
NET TO BUYERS                                                           $7.50/share plus $2.50/share 
 
GENERAL RULE FOR BAD NEWS CASES: 
 
total decrease in market value = theoretical decrease / (1 - % of shares damaged) 
 
Note that the formula makes it clear that the greater the percentage of shares damaged (the 
greater the turnover of different shares), the greater the total decrease in market price (and the 
greater the aggregate damages or settlement value). Indeed, in a case in which all of the shares 
have turned over, the total decrease in value is theoretically infinite. To be sure, a company cannot 
decline in value to less than zero. But SFCA damages can wipe out 100 percent of a company’s 
market capitalization even though some stockholders did not trade. The following chart sets forth 
the results at various levels of absolute turnover. 
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BAD NEWS CASE EXAMPLES  
 
Assume hypothetical pre-damages decrease of $10M: 
 
If 20% of shares are damaged, total award is $2.5M or $1.25/share. 
 
If 40% of shares are damaged, total award is $6.67M or $1.67/share. 
 
If 50% of shares are damaged, total award is $10M or $2.00/share. 
 
If 60% of shares are damaged, total award is $15M or $2.50/share. 
 
If 80% of shares are damaged, total award is $40M or $5.00/share. 
 
If 90% of shares are damaged, total award is $100M or $10.00/share.* 
 
 
* Note that $100M is more than entire value of company at $9 per share. 
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GOOD NEWS CASE 
 
PRE-DISCLOSURE MARKET VALUE (10M shares)                                   $100M  = 10/share 
 
POST-DISCLOSURE THEORETICAL VALUE                           110M  = 11/share 
 
DAMAGES TO SELLERS (60% absolute turnover)                                        6M  = .60/share 
 
NET MARKET VALUE POST (tentative)                                     110M – 6M = 104M = 10.40/share 
 
But if market value post is 104M, then damages should be 4M x .60 = 2.40M. 
Now market value post is 110M less 2.4M = 107.6M = 10.76/share. 
Process repeats to limit of 3.75M in total damages to sellers. 
 
DAMAGES TO SELLERS                                                           3.75M / 600K shares = .625/share 
 
NET TO HOLDERS                                                   110M − 3.75M = 106.25M = 10.625/share 
 
GROSS TO SELLERS                                                           10/share + .625/share = 10.625/share 
 
 
GENERAL RULE FOR GOOD NEWS CASES: 
 
total increase in market value =  theoretical increase / (1 + % of shares damaged) 
 
One can calculate the total percentage increase in market price in a good news case using the 
following formula: 
 
total increase in market value = expected increase / (1 + % of shares damaged) 
 
Note that the formula makes it clear that the greater the percentage of shares damaged (that is the 
greater the turnover of different shares – absolute turnover), the smaller the total increase in 
market price (and the smaller the aggregate damages or settlement value). The following chart 
sets forth the results at various levels of absolute turnover. 
 
 
 30 
 
GOOD NEWS CASE EXAMPLES  
 
Assume hypothetical pre-damages increase of $10M: 
 
If 20% of shares are damaged, total award is $1.67M or $.833/share. 
 
If 40% of shares are damaged, total award is $2.86M or $.714/share. 
 
If 50% of shares are damaged, total award is $3.33M or $.667/share. 
 
If 60% of shares are damaged, total award is $3.75M or $.625/share. 
 
If 80% of shares are damaged, total award is $4.44M or $.556/share. 
 
If 100% of shares are damaged, total award is $5.00M or $.500/share.* 
 
 
* Note that $5M is exactly half of the hypothetical increase. 
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